Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics

Saccades made during memory maintenance prioritize memory for the saccade target, but it is unclear if this benefit is specific to a location or extends across memorized objects. In three experiments, we examined whether saccadic selection spreads to other locations within the same object. In Experiment 1, we asked observers to remember three oriented Gabors presented either within contour-defined objects or without object structure. A subsequent movement cue prompted observers to move their eyes to the indicated location. We then probed memory for stimuli at locations equidistant from the saccade target, in either the same or a different object. Memory was best for stimuli at locations congruent with the saccade target, and consistently weaker for other stimuli presented in the same or a different object than the saccade target. In Experiment 2, we created more complex objects by adding more object features to the stimulus. Again, memory performance was best for stimuli congruent with the saccade target location, whereas memory in incongruent trials was worse and similar for stimuli in the same and different object as the saccade target. In Experiment 3, we tested if saccadic selection is present and propagates within the object in a change detection task. Again, memory performance (i.e., change detection) was best at the saccade target location. However, this memory benefit also spread to other locations within the same object. Our results imply that saccadic selection in visual working memory is primarily space-based but can also spread towards locations within the object where a saccade was directed.

Inhibition of return (IOR) refers to the slowing of response times (RTs) for stimuli presented at previously inspected locations relative to novel locations. However, the exact processing stage(s) at which IOR occurs, and its nature across different response modalities, remain debated. By reanalyzing RT data from a target-target IOR paradigm with a single noisy accumulator model, we tested whether IOR could occur at sensory or attentional stages of processing, or at later stages of decision and action selection. We considered IOR under two conditions: manual and saccadic responses. The within-trial Gaussian noise parameter best explained both manual and saccadic IOR, suggesting that in both modalities, IOR may result from a more fluctuating accumulation of evidence for repeated locations. These results support the hypothesis that target-target IOR may primarily involve attentional-level mechanisms. Significance statementWe respond more slowly to a stimulus that is presented within a short interval in the same location ("inhibition of return"), a bias thought to promote efficient visual exploration. Using evidence-accumulation modeling of manual and eye-movement reaction times from two previous studies, we found that the key change linked to inhibition of return is greater within-trial variability (noise) in evidence accumulation, not a higher decision threshold. Understanding which processing stage is affected can help connect behavioral effects to the brain networks that support attention and orienting.

Visual working memory (vWM) is often linked to conscious experience and visual imagery, but it is typically described as a system that stores separate, independent items. These assumptions are difficult to reconcile, given the unified nature of conscious experience. Here, we test the hypothesis that vWM relies on at least two distinct representations: an underlying, unconscious memory trace and a consciously accessible, integrated representation. A total of 216 participants performed a change-detection task, in which they rated their perceptual awareness of the memory display during the maintenance interval. Critically, we manipulated the statistical properties of the displays (average item size and size variability) to probe sensitivity to unified ensemble-level structure. Results revealed a dissociation between subjective and objective measures. Perceptual awareness increased for displays with larger, more variable items, whereas objective performance improved for displays with smaller, less variable items. Despite this difference, subjective awareness still predicted performance, and even incorrect responses showed consistent biases rather than random guesses. Importantly, individual differences in imagery vividness (VVIQ) were selectively associated with subjective awareness and estimation bias, but not with objective correctness. These precision biases were further shaped by display statistics, suggesting that multiple representations can guide behavior. Together, our findings support a reinterpretation of vWM performance in which task responses can draw on both unconscious and consciously accessible representations. One possible explanation for these behavioral patterns is that subjective experience reflects integrated, ensemble-like representations, while objective performance depends more strongly on item-specific information. Public significance statementsWorking memory allows us to temporarily hold and use information, and differences in this ability are closely linked to broader cognitive skills such as intelligence. This study shows that these differences may not depend only on how much information people can store, but also on how they experience it: some individuals appear to rely more on consciously accessible, image-like representations, especially when memory is uncertain or prone to error. By demonstrating that subjective experience and the vividness of imagery can shape behavior independently of objective accuracy, these findings suggest that how we use memory may be as important as how much we can store, with implications for understanding individual differences in cognition.

Attentional control balances proactive suppression of predictable distractors with reactive suppression of unexpected ones. Yet, how internal states such as alertness shape this balance is unclear. Using pupillometry and eye tracking across two probability-cueing experiments (conducted in 2024) with varying distractor prevalence, we distinguished tonic (baseline pupil size across blocks) from trial-level pupil size fluctuations (trial-by-trial residual variability in pre-stimulus pupil size). With moderate prevalence, suppression of frequent-region distractors developed gradually, whereas high prevalence induced near-immediate suppression. Behavioral measures (e.g., reaction times) were closely linked to tonic and trial-level pupil size fluctuations. Critically, both alertness components jointly influenced control: during early learning, heightened trial-level pupil size increased distractor capture and reduced target fixations, whereas later on, suppression shifted to a proactive mode resilient to trial-level fluctuations. Under high prevalence, this shift occurred faster. Notably, higher trial-level pupil size generally accelerated first target selection. These findings show that tonic alertness and trial-level alertness fluctuations dynamically regulate reactive and proactive control during statistical learning. Impact StatementThis study shows that people become better at ignoring predictable distractions over time, but that this improvement depends not only on what they have learned about the task environment, but also on their current level of alertness. By combining eye tracking and pupil measures, we found that temporary increases in alertness can sometimes help people orient more quickly to relevant information, yet during earlier stages of learning they can also make attention more vulnerable to distracting events. These findings suggest that successful focus in complex environments depends on a dynamic interplay between learned expectations and moment-to-moment fluctuations in mental state, with implications for understanding sustained attention in settings such as monitoring, driving, and other tasks that require people to stay engaged while resisting distraction.

We study how confidence in perceptual decisions depends on whether it is communicated verbally (e.g., "very likely") or numerically (e.g., "80% certainty"). We find that verbal expressions more reliably distinguish correct from incorrect choices than numerical reports, challenging the common assumption that numerical probabilities provide more precise representations of uncertainty. Additionally, in a dyadic decision-making task in which participants can revise their initial reports based on a partners choice and expressed confidence, verbal and numerical reports are equally effective in supporting accurate revisions of initial judgments. Together, these results underscore the effectiveness of verbal expressions as a means of conveying decision confidence.

Iconicity in spoken language refers to the mapping of speech sounds to meaning. For example, the pseudoword "bouba" is judged to sound rounded, whereas the pseudoword "kiki" is judged to sound pointed (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). Recent work has found systematic relationships between speech acoustics and iconicity ratings in various meaning domains, including shape. To control for confounding by semantic knowledge, much research on iconicity relies on pseudowords. However, the role of iconicity in conveying the meanings of real words is still poorly understood. Here, we compared the relationship between speech acoustics and shape iconicity ratings for both pseudowords and real words. In this experiment, participants rated real words and pseudowords for how rounded or pointed they sounded. We compared the relationship between 12 acoustic parameters and the rounded/pointed ratings for both words and pseudowords. We found that the correlations between these acoustic parameters and the ratings were similar for real words and pseudowords, providing key evidence that iconicity of real words is linked to speech acoustics.

Language production requires the coordination of multiple cognitive processes. The ability to anticipate and override a habitual response in favor of a contextually-appropriate response are key subprocesses of cognitive control which enable speakers to communicate effectively. Word retrieval involves the co-activation of semantically related alternatives from which the speaker must select the appropriate target representation. Although cognitive control mechanisms have been proposed to contribute to resolving semantic interference during language production, the nature of these control processes remain unclear. Studies investigating the temporal dynamics of cognitive control during decision making tasks have led to a distinction between two operating processes: proactive control, initiated prior to the occurrence of conflict, and reactive control recruited after conflict is detected. We investigated the roles of proactive and reactive control in resolving interference between competing linguistic representations during word retrieval. We analyzed congruency sequence effects combined with delta-plot distributional analyses to dissociate potential adjustments in proactive versus reactive cognitive control in a picture-naming task manipulating semantic context compared to a minimally-linguistic Stroop-like paradigm. Reaction time distributional properties following semantically related trials revealed the engagement of proactive control in semantic interference resolution during word retrieval in the PWI task. In contrast, reactive inhibitory control was engaged in resolving semantic interference following low conflict trials. This distinction was not present in the minimally-linguistic task, which did not appear to engage adaptive control to the same extent. These findings demonstrate that both proactive and reactive cognitive control mechanisms contribute to language production, and are engaged dynamically, adjusting trial-by-trial to resolve semantic interference during word retrieval. In addition, our study provides important insight into the comparison of language with other cognitive domains and positions linguistic paradigms as being instrumental in the study of cognitive control dynamics.

The willingness to exert cognitive effort is essential but is constrained by the subjective cost of effort. Although effortful tasks are often avoided, positive bias about ones own performance may help sustain engagement with cognitive demands. Here, participants completed an effort-based decision-making task and reported trial-by-trial predictions of their own performance, allowing us to quantify performance prediction error (PPE) as the discrepancy between subjective and objective accuracy. The results showed that PPE was predominantly positive and increased with effort level, indicating greater overestimation under higher cognitive demands. Using a computational model, we show that choices were best explained by a learning model in which rewarded trials accompanied by positive PPE decreased subsequent sensitivity to effort. A confidence-based control model did not provide a better account of choices, suggesting that this effect was better captured by positive performance bias than by confidence alone. Our findings provide a computational account of how biased self-evaluation may attenuate the subjective cost of cognitive effort and extend the positive bias literature to the task need for cognitive effort.

During active vision, the brain must coordinate where to move the eyes with predictions about upcoming sensory input. Before each saccade, perception is enhanced at the upcoming fixation location, but whether this enhancement depends on expectations about target features remains unknown. Here, participants prepared a saccade to a cued location while reporting the presence and orientation of a brief visual target that appeared either at the saccade goal or at the opposite location. Feature expectation was manipulated across blocks by varying the probability of the two target orientations. Perceptual sensitivity (d') increased when targets were presented at the saccade goal, consistent with presaccadic enhancement, and was also higher for less expected features. However, these effects were independent: feature probability did not alter the magnitude of presaccadic enhancement. Moreover, presaccadic enhancement increased near saccade onset, whereas the advantage for less expected features weakened as movement onset approached. Saccade latency revealed a contrasting pattern. Visual targets presented at the saccade goal delayed movement initiation. This delay depended on feature probability, with longer latencies for unexpected than for expected features only when saccades were directed towards the target. This location-specific effect persisted after accounting for perceptual report, and the latency cost for unexpected features was reproduced in a follow-up experiment. Together, these findings show that feature probability enhanced sensitivity to unexpected information independently of presaccadic enhancement, while selectively delaying saccade initiation towards targets with unexpected features. This dissociation suggests that feature expectation modulates perception and action through functionally distinct forms of visual processing.

Perception is typically biased towards prior expectations. In some cases, however, it seems repelled away from expectations, such that percepts appear less like what is expected. Even more intriguingly, separate studies have recently reported that predictions derived from gravity may shape perception in opposing ways. Specifically, gravity causes unsupported objects to accelerate downwards, leading to two predictions; that objects will move downwards (location prior) and at an increasing speed (acceleration prior). There is evidence that perceptual judgements are attracted towards location priors yet repelled from acceleration ones. Here we examine these effects in the same paradigm to determine whether they result from different types of stimuli and judgement, or more interestingly, might result from opposite influences of common predictive mechanisms influencing perception. We first replicate previous reports of a systematic bias to report upward moving objects as more accelerating than downward moving objects: effectively a repulsion from acceleration priors. We then show that the effect applies both at the level of retinal space and due to contextual cues concerning gravitational direction. Finally, we find that participants errors in a location reproduction task are similarly consistent with a repulsion from acceleration priors and, simultaneously, with an attraction towards location priors. We conclude by considering the ways in which these concurrent attractive and repulsive biases may reflect mechanisms optimising fast, accurate, and informative experiences in our ever-changing sensory world, therefore optimising the interface between perception and learning. Public Significance StatementIn a series of behavioural experiments, we show that expectations about how objects move due to gravity concurrently attract perception towards the prediction that objects move downwards, and repel perception away from the prediction that they do so at an increasing rate. These opposing influences inform current theories of perceptual processing, which explain how expectations may generate percepts that are fast, veridical, and informative.

Visual search is a critical component of many professions such as military operations, baggage screening, and radiology. Aided Target Recognition (AiTR) systems are designed to highlight potential threats across the operator visual field in real-time, directing attention and improving accuracy. However, these systems may impact search and, consequently, situational awareness by diverting attentional resources from non-highlighted, yet relevant, locations. Previous work suggests that scene gist is extracted within the first 250 ms of scene onset (Vo & Henderson, 2010). As such, this study examined whether a 250 ms AiTR onset delay could encourage a more even distribution of attention. Participants searched synthetically generated scenes and classified each person in the scene as armed or unarmed. Depending on their condition, participants either saw the scenes unaugmented (No AiTR condition), with AiTR highlights consisting of red bounding boxes around armed people and yellow boxes around unarmed (AiTR condition), or with AiTR highlights presented 250 ms post scene onset (Delayed AiTR condition). A surprise memory test of background objects presented in the search scenes was administered to all participants upon completion of the search task. As predicted and preregistered, results showed less overt attentional deployment to background information (anything other than the people themselves) in the AiTR condition compared to No AiTR , however, decreased overt attentional deployment was not seen in the Delayed AiTR group. A similar pattern was observed in the memory data (with the AiTR condition having a lower score than the No AiTR condition and the Delayed AiTR condition), this difference was not significant.

Speech comprehension in noisy environments often requires cognitive effort, but listeners may disengage when comprehension becomes impossible. Eye movements have recently emerged as a promising new measure of listening effort, but it remains unclear whether eye movements are sensitive to the full effort profile across easy, difficult, and impossible speech comprehension. Across four experiments, participants listened to sentences at easy, difficult, and impossible levels of multi-talker background babble while pupil size and eye movements were recorded. Pupil size generally followed the expected inverted u-shaped effort profile: low for easy speech, maximal for difficult but still intelligible speech and lower again for impossible speech, although this pattern partly reflected sustained, condition-specific differences and not only sentence-evoked responses. Gaze dispersion - measuring the spread of eye movements - decreased with high temporal selectivity during difficult relative to easy and impossible speech, indicating reduced eye movements during active, effortful listening. However, gaze dispersion was also lower, but less temporally selective, during impossible compared to easy listening, especially in non-baseline-corrected analyses, suggesting that reduced eye movements do not index listening effort uniquely. Instead, eye movements appear to reflect both attentional engagement during difficult listening and disengagement or inward attention when meaningful listening is no longer possible. These findings indicate that pupil size and eye movements provide complementary indices of listening-related cognition, and highlight the integration of listening, cognition, and motor systems.

Human decision-making behavior varies widely across individuals and task conditions. This variability is often interpreted in terms of different suboptimal decision strategies, but the principles that govern these suboptimalities remain poorly understood. We propose that some of these suboptimalities can be understood in terms of limited-capacity, but information-efficient, inference processes that inform decision-making. We developed and used new theoretical and empirical approaches to compare the amount of information used (capacity) to the effectiveness with which it was used (accuracy) by individual participants performing simple inference tasks. Variable, suboptimal performance was explained largely by inference that had variable, limited information capacity. Across these capacity limits, and regardless of whether the inference strategy was based on optimal or heuristic principles, the information was used effectively to maximize accuracy for a given capacity. This form of flexible and efficient information bottleneck reflects fundamental capacity-accuracy tradeoffs that structure individual variability.

Humans have been shown to use an internalized representation or prior of Earth gravity to predict object motion. Often, this is shown using the fact that humans tend to neglect an objects acceleration when predicting its motion. This bias tends to be ameliorated when the acceleration acting on the object is Earth gravity. It is currently unclear whether this prior can also be used when assessing ones self-motion. We immersed two cohorts of 20 seated participants in a virtual environment of a street scene. They experienced simulated self-motion consistent with either flying straight upwards towards the ceiling (ANTI-GRAVITY) or falling downwards towards the ground (GRAVITY). After 0.8 s to 1.4 s of motion, the screen turned blank, and participants pressed a button to indicate when they thought they reached the surface they were moving towards. In Experiment 1, they were instructed to use their eye level as the reference (i.e., when they imagined the floor or ceiling to be aligned with their eyes). In Experiment 2, they used their feet or the top of theirs heads to judge when they had reached the ceiling or floor, respectively. In Experiment 1, no differences between the GRAVITY and ANTI-GRAVITY conditions were found in terms of accuracy or precision, contrary to our hypotheses. In Experiment 2 participants pressed the button significantly later in the ANTI-GRAVITY condition than in the GRAVITY condition, in line with the predictions of the use of a gravity prior, while precision remained unaffected. Speculatively, the instructions in Experiment 1 may have made the experience less ecologically valid and immersive, thus preventing participants from activating the strong gravity prior. Experiment 2 (head/feet as reference), on the other hand, provides convincing evidence for an involvement of this prior in the prediction of self-motion. In sum, the study provides evidence that humans can rely on an internalized representation of Earth gravity when predicting self-motion, at least under ecologically valid task conditions. The absence of effects in Experiment 1 and their presence in Experiment 2 suggest that activation of this gravity prior depends on the framing of the task.

Humans rely on multiple sensory modalities, such as vision, audition, and touch, to perceive materials in everyday life. Previous research shows that multisensory perception leads to facilitation, yet the mechanisms responsible for this facilitation remain poorly understood. One potential mechanism is crossmodal prediction, whereby input from one modality generates predictions about another. While substantial research on multisensory facilitation has focused on bottom-up processes, such as spatial, temporal, and semantic congruency, the role of crossmodal predictions, particularly in material perception, has received little attention. To address this gap, we conducted two experiments, a reaction time task and a material rating task, in which participants viewed computer-generated animations of familiar objects being dropped to the ground. The paradigm exploited the natural temporal structure of impact events: pre-impact visual appearance provides information about an objects material and therefore can generate expectations about the forthcoming impact sound. Critically, participants saw the event only until before the impact, after which the video was masked. Thus, vision and audition were temporally aligned but not presented concurrently, allowing us to isolate the influence of visually driven expectations on the incoming auditory information without a bottom-up conflict. In some trials, the sound matched the expected material, but in a subset, it was incongruent, violating expectations elicited by the preceding visual information. Across both experiments, participants took longer to respond on incongruent than congruent trials, suggesting increased processing demands. In the rating task, incongruent trials also shifted material judgments, such that ratings reflected a weighted combination of incoming auditory information and visually driven predictions, with large individual differences in relative cue weighting. These findings suggest that priors on material properties from one modality, specifically vision, not only establish high-level expectations within the modality about an objects future state, but also extend across modalities.

During sideways movement of an observer, optic flow parsing - in which an objects speed in the world is extracted from all the other visual movement present in the scene, self-generated and otherwise - has been shown to be incomplete, leading to biases in speed perception, particularly when object and observer are moving in opposite directions. Here, we assess how judgements about the speed of objects moving in depth (judged relative to the world) towards or away from an observer (6 m/s) are affected by simultaneous movement of the observer either in the same or opposite direction as the object. In a virtual reality display, participants (n = 25) viewed a sphere simulated as moving in a corridor either while they were stationary or during visually simulated self-motion in the same or opposite direction as the object. They judged the spheres movement relative to the world by comparing its motion to a probe sphere that travelled laterally across the corridor in front of them. In a second experiment (n = 28) participants performed the same task but during faster self-motion (10 m/s). The second cohort also judged the direction in which the object was perceived to move during the same combinations of self and object speeds. Object speed was overestimated when the object travelled in the direction opposite to the observer compared to how objects motion was judged when the observer was stationary. However, object speed was also overestimated during self-motion in the same direction as the object where participants were also much more likely to misjudge the direction of motion of the object. Precision of judgements was lower when self-motion was simulated than it was for stationary observers. A simple arithmetic model of flow parsing fails to capture these results satisfactorily, suggesting that different mechanisms may be at play when the observer travels in the same direction as a moving object and is vulnerable to misperceiving its direction of travel.

Current debates regarding the relative contribution of saliency versus semantics to gaze control often rely on comparing the predictive power of saliency and meaning maps. We argue that such indirect, global approaches are fundamentally limited because fixations arise from heterogeneous, local causes that are conflated in whole-scene comparisons. To substantiate this claim, we used a direct method where participants explicitly identified the reasons for fixation at specific clusters of high fixation density, distinguishing between low-level saliency and various semantic categories, as well as the most important one. The obtained judgments revealed that multiple factors contribute simultaneously to gaze control. Although their influence varied across fixation clusters, semantics generally dominated saliency. Notably, abstract semantic categories, particularly "unknown/unusual," proved important, highlighting the role of prior knowledge and novelty besides personal relevance in guiding attention. To interpret these findings in the context of existing models, we propose a framework distinguishing between processes highlighting interesting locations in the image from a sampling strategy translating this information into scanpaths. Within this framework, classic saliency and meaning maps are viewed as restricted inputs to the strategy, whereas deep learning-based models (e.g., DeepGaze IIE) are more general and may also implicitly encode aspects of the strategy itself. Consistent with this, we found that the predictive performance of DeepGaze IIE varied less significantly with the specific reasons for fixation than that of classic saliency and meaning map approaches.

Sentence comprehension requires the incremental construction of syntactic structure and semantic interpretation. Prior neural work (Nelson et al., 2017) identified key neural events at major phrase boundaries during sentence comprehension. To investigate a behavioral correlation of these processes, we used self-paced reading to examine the impact of syntactic phase boundaries, semantic congruence, and sentence structure on sentence processing. Participants read object-relative, subject-relative, and canonical control sentences one word at a time and a subsequent comprehension task. Reading times were analyzed relative to phrase boundaries, node-closing operations, and semantic congruence. Object-relative sentences produced the greatest processing difficulty, demonstrated by increased reading times and decreased comprehension accuracy. Reading times peaked at the phrase boundaries, indicating that processing costs are tied to constituent completion rather than individual lexical categories. Reading times also increased with the number of syntactic constituents completed at a phrase boundary. Agent-patient semantic congruence produced its largest effects in object-relative sentences, suggesting that semantic information interacts with syntactic computations when processing demands are greatest. These findings demonstrate that self-paced reading is sensitive to the incremental processing associated with syntactic constituent completion. Processing costs are tied more closely to phrase completion than to individual lexical categories, scale with the amount of syntactic structure completed at a boundary and interact with agent-patient semantic interpretation during object-relative sentence comprehension. Together, these findings support a view of sentence comprehension in which syntactic structure building and semantic interpretation proceed incrementally and interact continuously throughout online language processing.

When we feel restless and easily distracted, continuously switching tasks (exploration), our pupils tend to be large. In contrast, when we are calmly focused on a single task (exploitation), our pupils tend to be small. According to the Adaptive Gain Theory (AGT), a switch from exploitation to exploration is associated with an increase in norepinephrine in the locus coeruleus, which in turn triggers pupil dilation. However, the AGT does not provide a functional explanation of why exploration triggers pupil dilation. One possibility is that visual sensitivity, which increases with pupil size, is especially important during exploration. We set out to provide evidence consistent with this functional explanation, as well as to replicate two key previous results. Participants performed a four-armed bandit task, which induces both exploration and exploitation behavior. During the task, participants also needed to detect an occasional and unpredictable near-threshold peripheral flash. We replicated two key results: pupils were larger during exploration than during exploitation; and increased pupil size (overall, independent of exploration status) was associated with increased visual sensitivity. However, most importantly, we did not find that visual sensitivity was higher during exploration than during exploitation; probably, the reliable-yet-tiny increase in pupil size during exploration was too small to affect visual sensitivity. We conclude that key previous results are replicable; however, common experimental paradigms, such as the four-armed bandit task, induce only small changes in exploration behavior. Therefore, more powerful paradigms are required in order to test functional explanations of pupil-size changes during exploration and exploitation.

Serial dependence is influenced by sensory uncertainty and contextual continuity, but it remains controversial whether these influences reflect separate mechanisms or different expressions of a shared updating process. Across two time reproduction experiments (N = 44), we examined how motion coherence and coherence transitions modulated the attraction of recent temporal history while controlling for central tendency effects from the current stimulus. In Experiment 1, the low coherence led to stronger serial dependence compared to the high coherence. In Experiment 2, enhanced coherence categories introduced salient contextual boundaries; serial dependence was markedly stronger on the same category transition than switch transition. A three-state Kalman filter model, comprising fast (serial dependence), slow (central tendency), and bias (decision carryover) states captured these patterns through coherence-dependent modulation of fast-state process noise and Kalman gain. Within the tested model space, this precision-weighting account was selected in both experiments; with little evidence that an explicit state reset was needed. These findings support the precision-weighted updating account in which recent history is weighted according to the reliability and stability of the current perceptual environment.